Tuesday, April 22, 2014

Re-visiting the useful idiot, part 2

It looks like Edward Snowden was allowed the opportunity to ask Vladimir Putin if Russia unlawfully spies on individuals' communications. Unsurprisingly, Snowden and his supporters now feel a bit red in the face about the whole experience. What struck me, however, was Snowden's response to the whole episode. The interesting part here is not Snowden's stated desire to get Putin on record on the issue; instead, we're getting some possible insight into Snowden's overall goals in undertaking this whole saga nearly a year ago. I've been perplexed as to what Snowden's intentions might be throughout all of this (given the whole, you know, "championing civil liberties under the protection of the Putin administration" thing), but I think I'm starting to come to a conclusion on him: the guy really just doesn't get it. This is the part of his response that really hits it home for me:
I expected that some would object to my participation in an annual forum that is largely comprised of softball questions to a leader unaccustomed to being challenged. But to me, the rare opportunity to lift a taboo on discussion of state surveillance before an audience that primarily views state media outweighed that risk. Moreover, I hoped that Putin's answer – whatever it was – would provide opportunities for serious journalists and civil society to push the discussion further.
When this event comes around next year, I hope we'll see more questions on surveillance programs and other controversial policies. But we don't have to wait until then. For example, journalists might ask for clarification as to how millions of individuals' communications are not being intercepted, analysed or stored, when, at least on a technical level, the systems that are in place must do precisely that in order to function. They might ask whether the social media companies reporting that they have received bulk collection requests from the Russian government are telling the truth.
Let's be real: did he really expect his question to be a watershed moment for those seeking transparency from the Russian government? It's not as if we're just now beginning to get suspicious of this Putin guy after 14 10 14 years in power. Does he really think the Russian media have the power to unleash a flurry of investigations into Russia's domestic surveillance activities (nevermind certain other events in a neighboring country that are preoccupying the media's attention right now)? I really, really, have trouble believing that Snowden is actually this naive about his relationship with the Russian state. Stuff like this, however, is making that belief harder to hold on to.

Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Re-visiting the useful idiot

If one wanted to step back and criticize Western media outlets for being too quick to push Russian actions into a certain box, one might have a point. Still, we must also be mindful of how even sincere attempts at trying to offer an alternative viewpoint might also be counter-productive. Take the interview of former US Congressman Dennis Kucinich with Russian state outlet RIA Novosti as an example. This interview was worrying for two reasons. First, the tone of RIA Novosti's coverage has noticeably been shifting as of late. I generally found them to be a pretty objective news source (ironically) to keep up with events in Russia, though their coverage is seemingly shifting to fit a previously announced re-organization of state media.

Second, Kucinich's interview represents a common problem among those who seek to present a critical viewpoint regarding US foreign policy: rather than finding flaws in both sides of the argument, they cannot help but play right into the hands of the other side's propaganda. In the interview, Kucinich characterizes the new Ukrainian government as a "junta" that have allowed neo-Nazis to come to power, that NATO is an "anachronistic" organization that has pushed itself right to the Russian border, and that Western countries had a guiding role in the protests that forced Viktor Yanukovych out of power. Gee, where have we heard these arguments before? Certainly, I wouldn't accuse Kucinich of being a flag-waving supporter of what the Russians have done in Crimea. Nonetheless, what new perspective could he possibly think he is offering when he goes to Russian state media and pretty much re-states Kremlin talking points regarding Ukraine? Americans using Russian media as a means to present a non-mainstream viewpoint is not necessarily a new trend. When people like Kucinich use these outlets as a means to effectively ally their soapbox with that of Moscow, however, they are actually reinforcing rigid thought processes that exist on both sides of the relationship.

Thursday, April 3, 2014

Quixote or Pilate? Framing moral debates on military interventionism (Part 1)

This will be a short post that hopefully will lead to a more comprehensive idea as time goes on. Recently, I could not help but see two morality arguments that tend to develop regarding military interventionism: one resembling Don Quixote (in that it is possible to take military action without consequences) and one that resembles Pontius Pilate's statement about "clean" hands (a connection that certainly was made when thinking of the lack of Western intervention in the Syrian conflict in which the death total is reportedly in the six figures). Using the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example, we saw the Quixoterios of the Bush administration (who took actions under the guise of spreading a morally-based liberal democracy across the globe) under criticism from moralistic Pilaterians (quick aside: I'm using that term as simply adding an "s" to the end of Pilate's name implied that I was talking about some sort of ethical yoga....I'll bookmark that thought for the future, however) who saw the US intervention to blame for civilian deaths that occurred as a result of insurgent attacks. What was crucial to the Pilaterian position, however, was the consistent implication that the continued existence of Saddam Hussein's regime (the only plausible alternative to the invasion) would have provided a greater outlet for moral absolution than the invasion: that is, allowing a brutal regime to exist nonetheless maintained the "clean hands" provision. The wrinkle in all of this is that a third argument exists when approaching possible intervention: one that opposes intervention for non-moral reasons. We thus see that the Quixoterios and Pilaterians aren't polar opposites, but also don't come from the same set of assumptions.