Re-visiting the useful idiot

If one wanted to step back and criticize Western media outlets for being too quick to push Russian actions into a certain box, one might have a point. Still, we must also be mindful of how even sincere attempts at trying to offer an alternative viewpoint might also be counter-productive. Take the interview of former US Congressman Dennis Kucinich with Russian state outlet RIA Novosti as an example. This interview was worrying for two reasons. First, the tone of RIA Novosti's coverage has noticeably been shifting as of late. I generally found them to be a pretty objective news source (ironically) to keep up with events in Russia, though their coverage is seemingly shifting to fit a previously announced re-organization of state media.

Second, Kucinich's interview represents a common problem among those who seek to present a critical viewpoint regarding US foreign policy: rather than finding flaws in both sides of the argument, they cannot help but play right into the hands of the other side's propaganda. In the interview, Kucinich characterizes the new Ukrainian government as a "junta" that have allowed neo-Nazis to come to power, that NATO is an "anachronistic" organization that has pushed itself right to the Russian border, and that Western countries had a guiding role in the protests that forced Viktor Yanukovych out of power. Gee, where have we heard these arguments before? Certainly, I wouldn't accuse Kucinich of being a flag-waving supporter of what the Russians have done in Crimea. Nonetheless, what new perspective could he possibly think he is offering when he goes to Russian state media and pretty much re-states Kremlin talking points regarding Ukraine? Americans using Russian media as a means to present a non-mainstream viewpoint is not necessarily a new trend. When people like Kucinich use these outlets as a means to effectively ally their soapbox with that of Moscow, however, they are actually reinforcing rigid thought processes that exist on both sides of the relationship.

Quixote or Pilate? Framing moral debates on military interventionism (Part 1)

This will be a short post that hopefully will lead to a more comprehensive idea as time goes on. Recently, I could not help but see two morality arguments that tend to develop regarding military interventionism: one resembling Don Quixote (in that it is possible to take military action without consequences) and one that resembles Pontius Pilate's statement about "clean" hands (a connection that certainly was made when thinking of the lack of Western intervention in the Syrian conflict in which the death total is reportedly in the six figures). Using the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example, we saw the Quixoterios of the Bush administration (who took actions under the guise of spreading a morally-based liberal democracy across the globe) under criticism from moralistic Pilaterians (quick aside: I'm using that term as simply adding an "s" to the end of Pilate's name implied that I was talking about some sort of ethical yoga....I'll bookmark that thought for the future, however) who saw the US intervention to blame for civilian deaths that occurred as a result of insurgent attacks. What was crucial to the Pilaterian position, however, was the consistent implication that the continued existence of Saddam Hussein's regime (the only plausible alternative to the invasion) would have provided a greater outlet for moral absolution than the invasion: that is, allowing a brutal regime to exist nonetheless maintained the "clean hands" provision. The wrinkle in all of this is that a third argument exists when approaching possible intervention: one that opposes intervention for non-moral reasons. We thus see that the Quixoterios and Pilaterians aren't polar opposites, but also don't come from the same set of assumptions.

The Crimea crisis: Impacts on Arctic cooperation

It's no secret that the Western community is at a loss about developing a proper response to Russia's occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. While the US intelligence community seems anxious about Russia's next steps, there is also the question of how future cooperative initiatives will be affected by recent events. This has not only been seen with regards to the suspension of the Northern Eagle exercise between Norway, Russia, and the United States or the decision to reduce the G8 to a luckier number, but Russia's actions have even carried over into non-security initiatives with a major impact on Arctic cooperation. The biggest impact has been seen in Norway, whose shared border with Russia has allowed for some of the most positive Arctic initiatives to come to fruition in recent years. As a result of the Crimean crisis, however, the Norwegian environmental minister canceled a planned trip to Moscow. On a lower level, the Nordic Contact Center in Murmansk has also closed as a result of the crisis. General concern about the crisis' effects on the Russian economy may also scare off potential investors from Russia in the short-term.

The issue here is not so much a question of whether Russia will suddenly reverse the generally cooperative tone it has taken toward the Arctic region in recent years (although continued military exercises in the Arctic will surely keep alarmists guessing), but whether the international community will isolate Russia diplomatically in all aspects should it take further steps against Ukraine. This would surely prevent Russia's participation in Arctic diplomatic initiatives, which would be particularly damaging given the the country's role in the region. Seeing as the Arctic is one of the few areas of legitimate strategic cooperation between the West and Russia, it is certainly essential that Arctic practitioners leave the door open for continued cooperation with Russia in the future when conditions allow. When that will be, however, is a much more difficult question to answer.