The U.S. and the Arctic: Federal or state issue?

The author of this blog doesn't get to brag too much, but US Arcticzar Robert Papp found my question about US icebreaker procurement to be pretty humorous during last week's Arctic Change conference. It's the little things in life, really.

That nonetheless does provide an interesting segue into whether the US federal government should take more ownership over its Arctic territory versus just sitting back and letting the state of Alaska (which, well, IS our Arctic territory) handle most things. Certainly, the approach taken thus far has been pretty reasonable: why should the state let Washington (D.C., not State, though they'd be equally erroneous I suppose) take a more active role only to potentially muck things up in a region they can't relate to all that well? The present system of letting Alaska handle the tough stuff while having the federal government provide some "heavy lift" support when needed makes perfect sense in just about every aspect.

That is, of course, assuming Washington holds up its end of the bargain. The DoD has certainly maintained a longstanding emphasis on upholding its security guarantee to the state of Alaska with such exercises as Red Flag Alaska. What has been more problematic, however, is when Washington isn't responding to more urgent needs in the Arctic: namely a new icebreaker program for the US Coast Guard.

The effects of Tuesday's midterm elections have not yet been realized in terms of how they will relate to the Arctic, although the likely elevation of climate-change denier Jim Inhofe to the chairmanship of the Senate Environmental Committee probably won't help things. Although the Alaskan congressional delegation has certainly made the case for addressing the icebreaker issue in short order, we also can't expect the Coast Guard (often at the bottom of the totem pole on military spending) to be the beneficiary of a major procurement program in the near future.

Should the Arctic Council introduce a security component?

The question of a security component being established within the Arctic Council brings about pros and cons. One the one hand, it would formalize structures and understandings that are being undertaken on a primarily bilateral level between Arctic states. It would also serve as a useful way in which to engage Russia (and observer China, to a lesser extent) with the aim of producing potentially concrete results on matters of Arctic security. In short, why not?

Well, I'll be a good social scientist and address both sides of the equation: we should not be asking "why not" but instead "why." First of all, there is little reason to believe that such a component would actually produce these concrete results that multinational organizations actually exist to create. This would also arguably draw public attention away from the areas where the Arctic Council has already created positive discussion (such as issues facing indigenous peoples and the environmental impacts of increased human activity in the region). Additionally, increasingly irreconcilable strategic differences between Russia and the other Arctic states would likely prevent solid agreements governing the area of greatest concern: that being dangerous levels of militarization in the region. Results such as the 2011 search and rescue agreement are about the best we can hope for in this regard.

With that said, it is also worth wondering if such a component is really even necessary given what we've seen thus far. As much as I'm not terribly worried about Russia constantly reminding everyone of its recent military investments in the Arctic, one does have to wonder if things will suddenly take a turn for the worse given recent Russian behavior. There is certainly good reason to remain optimistic about Russia's general cooperation on Arctic issues, so perhaps it's worth considering if it's necessary to fix what is not broken. This is besides the fact that many security issues are better defined hemispherically rather than in the whole Arctic space. As such, it may be better not to create hassle where it does not need to exist.

5 questions for the United States on its Arctic goals in 2015

As the United States prepares to assume the Arctic Council chairmanship in 2015, Arcticphiles have already begun thinking of the different issues facing the organization from the US perspective in the next couple of years. As has been pointed out elsewhere, we also kind of already forgot that Canada still hasn't handed things over just yet. Coming from the American perspective, there is certainly reason to believe that this is a huge moment for the United States on Arctic matters. The United States certainly lags behind some other Arctic states on giving proper attention to the region, and its various Arctic strategies thus far provide some (but not enough) insight into how we will respond to the challenges facing the region. At the very least, here are a few questions that the United States will want to consider as it prepares to take on leadership of the global Arctic forum:

1) Will there be a security component to the Arctic Council?
2) Will the U.S. federal government take a more assertive role in Arctic affairs or continue to let the state of Alaska run its own affairs in certain areas?
3) Can the Arctic Council serve as an effective vehicle to strengthen relations with Russia?
4) Will the permanent Arctic Council secretariat established in 2013 be given greater resources to enact more concrete programs in the Arctic under the US chairmanship?
5) Can the United States effectively respond to the challenges facing the Arctic despite domestic opposition to taking strong measures against climate change?

In the next few days I will go into more detail on each of these questions, but this may be enough to ponder for now.

What a "shot-down" plane means for Ukraine

I had a paradoxical moment today when I walked past an ice cream truck and heard the driver having a conversation with a customer about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, it's always nice to hear members of the public engaged on issues facing the world around them. On the other hand, what does it say about my own relevance when someone from outside of the field (big assumption on my part, of course: you never know where you will find a Ph.D these days) can come to his own conclusions regarding difficult global events? Hopefully I haven't let everyone in on the big secret.

The bigger issue of the last two days, however, has been the purported shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines plane over Ukraine. There were also some notable events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though I'll perhaps leave further discussion on that to those in the ice cream business. We're faced with a few difficult questions in the latest incident in Ukraine. Is this ultimately Russia's fault for giving them advanced anti-aircraft technology in the first place? Why weren't airlines avoiding Eastern Ukraine? Should we blame Ukraine for not imposing stricter limits on aircraft overflying its territory? (Some analysis on that last point has already been done). The pessimistic side of me thinks that little will be done in regard to this, and not just because the United States and Russia have previous experience with controversial shoot-downs of passenger airliners. It's also not as if Russia wasn't already in the doghouse for actually invading Ukraine's territorial integrity. Perhaps the most interesting response will come from European countries (particularly the Netherlands, where this flight originated) who may feel that the deaths of over two hundred civilians with no relation to the conflict may be the ultimate red line. Certainly, Russia views this is problematic for its long-term goals in the region, which are becoming increasingly difficult to figure out. Perhaps this will prove to be the insurmountable event that will cause the Russians to dial back their role in the Ukrainian crisis.

Do Sweden and Finland get to hang out with the cool kids, too?

I'm using the opportunity after actually realizing that I should update my blog regularly a brief hiatus to discuss a recurring topic in European circles lately. And no, I'm not talking about Henrik Lundqvist. Instead, Finland and Sweden have increasingly broached the topic of joining NATO following Russia's actions in Ukraine. Now, Finland and Sweden's attitudes toward NATO are not a new topic--in fact, I strangely remember these things being discussed three years ago. And while recent events haven't created a surge in popular support for joining NATO in these two countries, they haven't stopped the two governments from using the opportunity to push the issue. In fact, both governments have increasingly attempted to warm the public to the idea of membership, something that was previously considered dead in the water considering lacking public support in both countries.

It was also announced today that Finland will hold a referendum on NATO membership. At the very least, this shows the seriousness of the issue for the Finnish government and also may be a signal to Russia that the government is seeking out a more active role in European security affairs. A recent memorandum of understanding between Finland and NATO also comes pretty darn close to offering the benefits enjoyed by full members without compelling Finland to accept the responsibility of full-fledged membership.

The Swedish government has been less forceful about the NATO issue, although some in government have not shied away from suggesting that Sweden join the alliance. Swedish defense circles are especially sensitive following a March 2013 incident in which an apparent simulated Russian "strike" against Swedish territory was unmet by Swedish air defense forces. As such, the Swedish government may find it necessary to move closer to the Finnish position, particularly as both countries are seeking greater interoperability on defense matters.
   

Why was John Mearsheimer on Russia Today?

As much as it would have made sense to make my "useful idiot" series a trilogy with today's post, it's probably wiser that lowly grad students don't go around referring to prominent scholars in the field with such terms.

Nonetheless, today's subject was quite a headscratcher for me (it's also worth noting that I'm late to discovering this video). It's one thing for an iconoclastic politician to end up in biased Russian media, but quite another for one of the most prominent American scholars of international relations to lend their voice to Kremlin propaganda. For those who don't want to sit through over 27 minutes of video, here's what you need to know: Mearsheimer is parroting the "Russia is only responding to Western encirclement" narrative often pushed by Moscow. Objectively, we need to look at this through two perspectives. If we're looking at things through more of a theoretical perspective, Mearsheimer is absolutely right: based on Russia's perspective of how it ought to be viewed in its own neighborhood, it wasn't so happy about the growth of NATO to its own borders. As such, we shouldn't be surprised that Russia has taken actions to combat what it sees as threats to its "near-abroad."

If we're looking at this through the perspective of how things ought to be conducted in the real world (God-forbid!), Mearsheimer saying what he said in this forum is actually rather dangerous. By using theoretical constructs about national interest and great-power politics as a manual for policy, Mearsheimer is essentially acquiescing to the misguided Russian mindset that Eastern Europe "belongs" to the Russian sphere of influence. Now, what Mearsheimer is saying is certainly in line with his less-than-sanguine views on the prospect of post-Cold War stability in Europe: if these views stay within the realm of academia, then they actually retain their merit. Mearsheimer also didn't earn his position by not contributing in a significant manner to the field of international relations. As such, it is incredibly troubling for an individual who actually has the expertise to intelligently comment on the question of, "Why is this crisis happening?" with the answer, "Because the US won't let Russia do as it wishes in Eastern Europe. Which, let's be honest, is not want countries like Poland and Estonia are the least bit okay with." If an American who "knows what he's talking about" is effectively giving credence to Russia's position, then who is left to decry the absurdity of it?

Re-visiting the useful idiot, part 2

It looks like Edward Snowden was allowed the opportunity to ask Vladimir Putin if Russia unlawfully spies on individuals' communications. Unsurprisingly, Snowden and his supporters now feel a bit red in the face about the whole experience. What struck me, however, was Snowden's response to the whole episode. The interesting part here is not Snowden's stated desire to get Putin on record on the issue; instead, we're getting some possible insight into Snowden's overall goals in undertaking this whole saga nearly a year ago. I've been perplexed as to what Snowden's intentions might be throughout all of this (given the whole, you know, "championing civil liberties under the protection of the Putin administration" thing), but I think I'm starting to come to a conclusion on him: the guy really just doesn't get it. This is the part of his response that really hits it home for me:

I expected that some would object to my participation in an annual forum that is largely comprised of softball questions to a leader unaccustomed to being challenged. But to me, the rare opportunity to lift a taboo on discussion of state surveillance before an audience that primarily views state media outweighed that risk. Moreover, I hoped that Putin's answer – whatever it was – would provide opportunities for serious journalists and civil society to push the discussion further.

When this event comes around next year, I hope we'll see more questions on surveillance programs and other controversial policies. But we don't have to wait until then. For example, journalists might ask for clarification as to how millions of individuals' communications are not being intercepted, analysed or stored, when, at least on a technical level, the systems that are in place must do precisely that in order to function. They might ask whether the social media companies reporting that they have received bulk collection requests from the Russian government are telling the truth.

Let's be real: did he really expect his question to be a watershed moment for those seeking transparency from the Russian government? It's not as if we're just now beginning to get suspicious of this Putin guy after 14 10 14 years in power. Does he really think the Russian media have the power to unleash a flurry of investigations into Russia's domestic surveillance activities (nevermind certain other events in a neighboring country that are preoccupying the media's attention right now)? I really, really, have trouble believing that Snowden is actually this naive about his relationship with the Russian state. Stuff like this, however, is making that belief harder to hold on to.

Re-visiting the useful idiot

If one wanted to step back and criticize Western media outlets for being too quick to push Russian actions into a certain box, one might have a point. Still, we must also be mindful of how even sincere attempts at trying to offer an alternative viewpoint might also be counter-productive. Take the interview of former US Congressman Dennis Kucinich with Russian state outlet RIA Novosti as an example. This interview was worrying for two reasons. First, the tone of RIA Novosti's coverage has noticeably been shifting as of late. I generally found them to be a pretty objective news source (ironically) to keep up with events in Russia, though their coverage is seemingly shifting to fit a previously announced re-organization of state media.

Second, Kucinich's interview represents a common problem among those who seek to present a critical viewpoint regarding US foreign policy: rather than finding flaws in both sides of the argument, they cannot help but play right into the hands of the other side's propaganda. In the interview, Kucinich characterizes the new Ukrainian government as a "junta" that have allowed neo-Nazis to come to power, that NATO is an "anachronistic" organization that has pushed itself right to the Russian border, and that Western countries had a guiding role in the protests that forced Viktor Yanukovych out of power. Gee, where have we heard these arguments before? Certainly, I wouldn't accuse Kucinich of being a flag-waving supporter of what the Russians have done in Crimea. Nonetheless, what new perspective could he possibly think he is offering when he goes to Russian state media and pretty much re-states Kremlin talking points regarding Ukraine? Americans using Russian media as a means to present a non-mainstream viewpoint is not necessarily a new trend. When people like Kucinich use these outlets as a means to effectively ally their soapbox with that of Moscow, however, they are actually reinforcing rigid thought processes that exist on both sides of the relationship.

Quixote or Pilate? Framing moral debates on military interventionism (Part 1)

This will be a short post that hopefully will lead to a more comprehensive idea as time goes on. Recently, I could not help but see two morality arguments that tend to develop regarding military interventionism: one resembling Don Quixote (in that it is possible to take military action without consequences) and one that resembles Pontius Pilate's statement about "clean" hands (a connection that certainly was made when thinking of the lack of Western intervention in the Syrian conflict in which the death total is reportedly in the six figures). Using the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example, we saw the Quixoterios of the Bush administration (who took actions under the guise of spreading a morally-based liberal democracy across the globe) under criticism from moralistic Pilaterians (quick aside: I'm using that term as simply adding an "s" to the end of Pilate's name implied that I was talking about some sort of ethical yoga....I'll bookmark that thought for the future, however) who saw the US intervention to blame for civilian deaths that occurred as a result of insurgent attacks. What was crucial to the Pilaterian position, however, was the consistent implication that the continued existence of Saddam Hussein's regime (the only plausible alternative to the invasion) would have provided a greater outlet for moral absolution than the invasion: that is, allowing a brutal regime to exist nonetheless maintained the "clean hands" provision. The wrinkle in all of this is that a third argument exists when approaching possible intervention: one that opposes intervention for non-moral reasons. We thus see that the Quixoterios and Pilaterians aren't polar opposites, but also don't come from the same set of assumptions.

The Crimea crisis: Impacts on Arctic cooperation

It's no secret that the Western community is at a loss about developing a proper response to Russia's occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. While the US intelligence community seems anxious about Russia's next steps, there is also the question of how future cooperative initiatives will be affected by recent events. This has not only been seen with regards to the suspension of the Northern Eagle exercise between Norway, Russia, and the United States or the decision to reduce the G8 to a luckier number, but Russia's actions have even carried over into non-security initiatives with a major impact on Arctic cooperation. The biggest impact has been seen in Norway, whose shared border with Russia has allowed for some of the most positive Arctic initiatives to come to fruition in recent years. As a result of the Crimean crisis, however, the Norwegian environmental minister canceled a planned trip to Moscow. On a lower level, the Nordic Contact Center in Murmansk has also closed as a result of the crisis. General concern about the crisis' effects on the Russian economy may also scare off potential investors from Russia in the short-term.

The issue here is not so much a question of whether Russia will suddenly reverse the generally cooperative tone it has taken toward the Arctic region in recent years (although continued military exercises in the Arctic will surely keep alarmists guessing), but whether the international community will isolate Russia diplomatically in all aspects should it take further steps against Ukraine. This would surely prevent Russia's participation in Arctic diplomatic initiatives, which would be particularly damaging given the the country's role in the region. Seeing as the Arctic is one of the few areas of legitimate strategic cooperation between the West and Russia, it is certainly essential that Arctic practitioners leave the door open for continued cooperation with Russia in the future when conditions allow. When that will be, however, is a much more difficult question to answer.